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COMMENTS

DES: The Patchwork Quilt
Of Tort Law
In the last ten years, litigation involving the synthetic estrogen
diethylstilbestrol (DES) has grown from a handful of cases in a few
jurisdictions to "one of the most far-flung, complicated and unique
bodies of product liability law in the nation's history."' DES, first
synthesized in England in 1938, was hailed as a major break-

through by those involved in estrogen therapy.2 Because the
formula was never patented, American pharmaceutical companies

applied for and were granted approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1941 to market DES using a standard
formula." Its intended use at that time was for the treatment of
1. DES LrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (June 9, 1981).
2. To be effective, natural estrogens had to be administered by painful injection of an oil solution. The synthetic variety of estrogen could be administered
orally at a cost of about one three-hundredth as much as natural estrogen. Id. at
5.
3. The facts surrounding the application, granting and marketing procedures
employed by 12 pharmaceutical companies (referred to as the "Small Committee") and the involvement of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1941 is at
the heart of the liability argument used by DES plaintiffs. The plaintiffs seek to
establish parallel behavior, actual agreement or tacit understanding among drug
manufacturers to engage in tortious activities resulting in a drug induced injury
under a concert of action theory of liability. (See infra notes 137-59 and accompanying text.)
Plaintiffs' claims generally charge the manufacturers with inadequate testing,
reliance on the results of one another's testing, manufacturing upon an agreed
formula, and using uniform marketing techniques. See Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 670 n.18
(1981); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981); Abel v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979). Defendants counter this
argument by contending that the FDA forced the pharmaceutical houses to standardize their clinical data, chemical formulae, labels and product literature. DES
LMG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5 (June 9, 1981). For a comprehensive summary of the
nature of the drug industry and its production of DES see Comment, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 975-78 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as FORDHAM Comment]. This student-written article has had a
significant impact upon DES litigation and product liability suits in general. It is
repeatedly quoted in the DES cases themselves. See DES LrrIo. REP. (ANDREWS)
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conditions unrelated to pregnancy.4
In 1947 the FDA further approved DES for use during pregnancy to help prevent miscarriage.0 Problems arose in 1971 when a
133 (July 14, 1981).
4. DES was intended for the treatment of senile vaginitis, gonnorheal vaginitis, menopause syndrome and suppression of lactation. DES LIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (June 9, 1981); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 170
N.J. Super. 183, 191 406 A.2d 185, 189 (1979).
5. FDA approval for this further use was based primarily on two medical
sources, Karnacky, The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of Threatened and
Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A PreliminaryReport, 35 S. MED. J.
838 (1942) and Smith, Diethystilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of
Complications of Pregnancy,56 AM. J. OBsm'r. & GYNEc. 821 (1948). Litigational
controversy over the FDA's approval of DES for use during pregnancy centers on
early published criticism of the above studies. These criticisms had noted a lack
of adequate controls. Further studies also cast doubt on the efficacy of DES use
for problem pregnancies. These studies included: Davis & Fugo, Steroids in the
Treatment of Early Pregnancy Complications, 142 J.A.M.A. 778 (1950);
Dieckmann, Davis, Rynkowicz & Pottinger, Does the Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OBSTEr. &
GYNEC. 1062 (1953) (hereinafter cited as the Dieckmann Study]. See also FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 963 n.2. For a current discussion of the effects of
DES, see Div. OF CANCER CONTROL AND REHAB., NAT'L CANCER INST., DEi'T OF
HEW, D.E.S.A.D. PROJECT, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT DES ExPosuER
BEFORE BIRTH. DHEW PUB. No. (NIH) 81-1118 (1981) [hereinafter cited as DES

QUESTIONS].

Ironically, the Dieckmann Study, conducted at the University of Chicago's
Lying-In Hospital, is now the basis for several DES lawsuits by women who were
administered the drug at that time. About half of the 2000 women who participated in the experiment received DES. The University of Chicago has made an
effort to contact all of the participants and established a special clinic in which
the sons and daughters of the group have been examined. University of Chicago
DES Program, Newsletter (August 1980). See also Mink v. University of Chicago,
460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). (Several Dieckman Study participants were allowed to bring battery claims against the University of Chicago.) The plaintiffs in
Mink contended that the FDA relied only on the earlier (1941) submission of
clinical data when FDA approval of DES for prevention of miscarriage was
granted in 1947 (an argument suggested in the FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3,
at 980). The approval was given even though scientific research at the time of the
1947 applications had found that substances given a pregnant woman would pass
through the placenta to the fetus. Lastly, the plaintiffs pointed to the available
tests on rats and mice, as early as 1939, which indicated that hormones crossed
the placenta and had a malforming action on the fetus. See also Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 323, 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629, 630 (1981) and supra
note 221 and accompanying text.
The defendants relied on the fact that the original pooling of data and the
1941 application to the FDA had nothing whatsoever to do with the use of DES in
problem pregnancies. Therefore, if approval for use in pregnancy was not sought

[1982:369]

DES

statistically significant relationship was discovered between the use
of DES during pregnancy and a rare form of cancer of the vagina
and cervix in some of the female offspring. That same year the
in 1941, and if the product was not marketed for that purpose until much later,
the manufacturers could not be said to have breached a duty of care to pregnant
women and their offspring in 1941. See also Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979); Birnbaum, DES Concert of
Action Theory: New Cases Bring New Confusion, NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1981, at 32.
Industry attorneys also say that the companies independently supplied data to
get FDA approval to market DES for treatment of pregnancies and that no applicants referred to the original pooled data. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6 (June 9,
1981).
It is also worth noting that during the early 1940's, prior to the 1947 FDA
approval, approximately 117 physicians administered DES experimentally to
pregnant women in conjunction with the research being conducted by Smith (see
Smith, supra). Telephone interview with Nancy Adess, Director of DES Action,
National, West Coast Office (Feb. 11, 1982).
6. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971); Greenwald, Barlowe, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer
After Maternal Treatment With Synthetic Estrogens, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390
(1971). Dr. Herbst reported that during the previous five years he had examined
eight young women with an extremely rare form of vaginal cancer called "clear
cell adenocarcinoma." Until that time the disease had been rare among women
under the age of 30. Seven of the cancer cases discovered by Dr. Herbst involved
females between the ages of 15 and 22. He found that the common denominator
for all eight women was the fact that their mothers had taken DES during pregnancy. Id. at 878-79. A similar association was reported shortly thereafter for
clear cell adenocarcinoma of the cervix. Noller, Decker, Lanier & Kurland, Clear
Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Cervix After Maternal Treatment With Synthetic
Estrogens, 47 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 620 (1972). For a comparison of the medical
profession's acceptance of statistical data as indicative of causation and the requirements of a legal cause in fact, see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 964
n.5. See also Shimkin,, A Diversion Into the Meaning of Cause, Drug Liability
and Litigation 1978 (Practicing Law Institute H4-3878) at 25; Simon, Basic Concepts in Medical Causation: Use of Statistics and Related Criteria, id. at 21.
In addition to the cancer link, it was discovered that non-cancerous tissue
changes are common in DES exposed daughters. Depending on the location, the
abnormally placed tissue is called "vaginal adenosis," "cervical erosion" or "ectropion." Other structural changes in the vagina or cervix have also been noted. DES
QUESTIONS, supra note 5, at 3. The majority of DES plaintiffs have a form of
adenosis rather than cancer. Though adenosis is referred to as a "pre-cancerous"
condition in DES lawsuits, the transition from vaginal adenosis to adenocarcinoma has not been documented histologically. See Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch
& Scully, Epidemiologic Aspects and Factors Related to Survival in 384 Registry
Cases of Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix, 135 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 876, 877 (1979) [hereinfter cited as Herbst & Cole]; Antonioli,
Burke, & Friedman, Natural History of Diethylstilbestrol Associated Genital
Tract Lesions: Cervical Ectopy and Cervicovaginal Hood, 137 AM. J. OBSTET. &
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FDA issued a bulletin to physicians warning against the use of
DES in pregnancy.' Shortly thereafter the first lawsuits by DES
daughters were filed against the manufacturers and distributors of
the drug.8
847, 847-53 (1980). Questions have been raised in some jurisdictions as to
the sufficiency of a complaint defining adenosis as the injury. See, e.g., Morrissy v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 761, 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (1979).
GYNEC.

7. FDA

DRUG BULLETIN, DIETHYSTILBESTROL CONTRAINDICTED IN PREGNANCY

(Nov. 1971). The bulletin discussed labeling changes for DES type drugs, with
pregnancy as a contraindication to use. All other estrogens were required to have
a warning of the DES link to cancer and to state that they were not indicated for
use during pregnancy. The bulletin also suggested the advisability of tracing the
offspring of those mothers who received DES during pregnancy. Physicians were
alerted to consider and question a possible DES connection among women with
irregular vaginal bleeding. A registry for research on hormonal transplacental
carcinogenisis was established in 1971 with offices at the University of Chicago
and Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston.
8. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (June 9, 1981). The factual pattern in each
of the cases is essentially the same: mothers of the plaintiffs were administered
DES during their pregnancies resulting in injury to the offspring while in utero,
but not evidencing itself for a minimum of ten years. The injuries range from
cancer resulting in death (Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 170 N.J.
Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979)) or radical surgery (Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79
A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981)) to adenosis and other genital tract disorders
(see supra note 6). As of June, 1981, more than 300 DES lawsuits had been filed
in 30 states involving more than 4000 plaintiffs. Of these, 70 were cancer cases
and the remainder involved other vaginal and cervical problems. DES LITIG. REP.
(ANDREWS) 4 (June 9, 1981). Some estimate the number of suits to be over 1000.
See Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A.J. 827
(1980). In response to plaintiff's interrogatories in a Washington, D.C., case,
Breeden v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 81-0718 (D.D.C. 1981), Eli Lilly compiled a list of
400 suits which had been filed against the company since 1974. DES LITIG. REP.
1
(ANDREWS) 349 (August 25, 1981).
The number of DES lawsuits increased dramatically after the United States
Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from the California Supreme Court's
decision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). Since Sindell, more than 150 DES
suits have been filed in San Francisco alone. DES LrriG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4 (June
9, 1981). Only five cases have been tried to completion, two with verdicts for
plaintiffs and three for defendants. Plaintiffs were succesful in Bichler v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981), aff'd, N.Y. Ct. App. (Chicago
Tribune, May 13, 1982, at 8, col. 4) (jury award of $500,000) and Needham v.
Schering, No. 76-C-1101 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1979), rev'd sub noma. Needham v.
White Laboratories, 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1980) (jury award of $800,000 but case
reversed and new trial ordered). Defendants were successful in Barros v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, No. 75-1226 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1978) (Plaintiff failed to prove
Squibb manufactured the DES that caused the injury); Kelly v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4 (June 9, 1981) (no liability because adenosis growth
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The DES suits are significant because they present an unusual
constellation of legal problems in the area of products liability.
Foremost among these problems is the identification of a defendant against whom suit can be brought.' This is no small matter
considering that DES was manufactured by at least 200 pharmaceutical companies under both trade and generic names.' 0 No
traditional legal theory in products liability law allows the plaintiff
a cause of action where the defendant cannot be identified as the
causal agent of the injury or the party against whom damages can
be assessed in total or in part." Other problems facing the DES
plaintiff involve statutes of limitations, 2 certification as a class in
class action suits, 8 possible absence of a cause of action for prenatal injury 4 and proving that the danger of DES was not unknowable at the time of manufacture." The plaintiffs' problems, therefore, are two-fold: getting to court and, once there, facing an
enormous burden of proof. The courts are then faced with the additional task of apportioning damages in a just manner.
Coupled with these legal problems is a lack of precise medical
conclusions.' As the courts struggle to find their way through the
labyrinth of DES litigation, medical researchers seek to unravel
the further ramifications of DES ingestion." Consequently, the pohad been removed successfully by surgery); and Zucker v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. C11123 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981) (defendant settled before trial).
9. Identification of the manufacturer is difficult because of the time lapse between ingestion of the drug and discovery of injury to the child. Medical and
pharmacy records often are no longer available. Furthermore, because DES was
usually prescribed generically, a pharmacist could use whatever brand he chose.
See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979); Birnbaum,

supra note 5, at 31.

10. See supra notes 8, 9, & infra note 104.
11. See R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW
(2d ed. 1974).
12. See text infra.
13. See text infra.

OF PRODucTS LIABILITY §

1:41

14. The prenatal injury aspect of DES litigation is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a discussion of actions for injury sustained prior to and after viability see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 971 n.24.
15. Id. at 968, 970, 971. See also text infra.
16. See B. SEAMAN & G. SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN SEx HORMONES
23 (1977).
17. The risk of developing cancer for daughters of mothers who ingested DES
is presently estimated to be in the range of 0.14 to 1.4 chances per thousand
through age 24. The peak usage of DES was between 1951 and 1953 with significant usage continuing into the early 1960's. DES-related cancers, therefore, are
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tential of lawsuits involving DES mothers,'" sons 19 and grandchildren 20 has become a growing reality.
The courts have responded to DES litigation with both traditional and novel analyses. For policy reasons, and because of the
desire to afford a remedy for the innocent plaintiffs' flagrant injuries, new legal theories have been devised and older theories have
been modified or combined in some jurisdictions to allow a cause
of action.21 As a result, there is at present neither a single coherent
predicted to occur well into the 1980's, but at a diminishing rate. See Herbst &
Cole, supra note 6, at 877, 882. Some studies also suggest that premature birth
and early pregnancy losses may be more common in DES exposed females.
Herbst, Hubby, Blough & Azizi, A Comparisonof PregnancyExperience in DESExposed and DES- Unexposed Daughters, 24 J. REPROD. MED. 62 (1980); Cousins,

Karp, Lacy & Lucas, Reproductive Outcomes of Women Exposed to Diethylstilbestrol in Utero, 56 J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 70, 70-76 (1980). Abnormalities of the

uterus and fallopian tubes have also been noted. See Registry for Research on
Hormonal Transplacental Carcinogenisis Newsletter (1979-80). An increase in
some types of genital tract abnormalities in DES sons has also been observed.
Among these are epidymal cysts (the epidimis is the first tube collecting sperm
from the testes), underdeveloped testes, undescended testes and lowered sperm
counts. Gill, Schumacher & Bibbo, Structural and Functional Abnormalities in
the Sex Organs of Male Offspring of Mothers Treated With Diethylstilbestrol
(DES), 16 J. REPROD. MED. 147 (1976); Gill, Schumacher, Bibbo, Straus, &

Schoenberg,

Association of Diethylstilbestrol Exposure in

Utero With

Cryptorchidism, Testicular Hypoplasia and Semen Abnormalities, 122 J. UROL-

36 (1979).
18. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See
also supra note 5.
19. Approximately 10 suits have been filed alleging that males have developed DES related injuries. In O'Donnell v. Eli Lilly & Co., DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 19 (June 9, 1981) (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed 1981), suit was brought by parents
and their two sons. A third son had died of cancer. The plaintiffs contended that
Laurence O'Donnell was diagnosed as having cancer of the testicle, kidney and
other parts of his body in 1975. He later developed a tumor in the chest and died
in August, 1977. Testicular cancer was diagnosed in his brother in 1975 resulting
in the removal of a testicle. Another tumor was removed from his heart in 1977.
In April, 1980, the third brother had a testicle removed.
See also Lawler, DES Daughters Are Not Alone, 3 DES ACTION VOICE 4
(1982).
20. Carroll v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. B-138-CA (E.D. Tex. 1981). This was the
first plaintiff to allege that he was injured by his grandmother's use of DES. The
action was brought by a mother on behalf of herself and her son claiming that the
grandmother's use of DES resulting in various abnormalities of the mother's genital tract which resulted in the premature birth of her son and the onset of cerebral palsy. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 534 (Oct. 9, 1981).
21. The theories of liability are: alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability and market-share liability. See text infra.
OGY
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legal theory nor a consistent set of standards Which have been applied by the courts. Consequently, the DES decisions have begun
to resemble a patchwork quilt of legal reasoning and conclusions.
The upshot of this multi-faceted approach is that judicial discretion has emerged as the determining factor in the outcome of the
lawsuits; and recovery appears to depend more upon the particular
jurisdiction of the suit rather than upon any consistent, objective
criteria.2 2 This Comment will present an overview of the major issues confronting the DES litigant and will analyze the arguments
and reasoning of the most significant cases addressing those issues.
Common factors upon which the courts tend to base their decisions
will be discussed.
PROCEDURAL BARRIERS

The Statute of Limitations
A state's statute of limitations is the first serious obstacle encountered by DES plaintiffs. Statutes of limitations, as devices for
repose, were enacted to serve a valid purpose in the judicial system.'8 Often they eliminate the dangers of contrived injuries, faded
memories, missing witnesses and unavailable evidence.' 4 In this
function they protect potential defendants.' 5 Courts are bound to
follow these legislative enactments despite the validity of the
plaintiff's claim.26 In their application, therefore, statutes of limitations are purely arbitrary. Ideally, only the "slumbering" plaintiff
is meant to be punitively affected.'7 Nevertheless, in DES as well
as in other drug related cases, it is the manifestation of the injury
22. See Norris, Fudala & Watson, Selected Recent Court Decisions, 7 AM. J.
218 (1981).
23. Birnbaum, "FirstBreath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products

LAW & MED. 193,

Liability Cases, 13 FORUM 279 (1977). See also O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668

F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

24. Birnbaum, supra note 23, at 279 (citing Order of Railroad Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
117 N.H. 164, 172, 371 A.2d 170, 174 (1977) (citing Developments in the
Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950)).
25. See O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981); Raymond v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. at 170, 371 A.2d at 173 (citing Note, Torts- Negligence-Legal Malpractice-DiscoveryRule Applied to Lawyer's Negligent Title

Search-Hendrickson v. Sears, 9 SUFF. L. REV. 1448, 1455 (1975)).
26. Birnbaum, supra note 23, at 279 (citing Sedlak v. Ford Motor Co., 64
Mich. App. 61, 63, 235 N.W.2d 63, 64 (1975)).

27. Birnbaum, supra note 23, at 290.
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which is slumbering, through no fault of the plaintiff.2 8

Although state law varies, a tort or personal injury limitation
period typically runs two to three years from the time of injury.
That point in time at which the injury has "occurred" becomes the
critical issue which the court must address.2 That occurrence is
defined by various jurisdictions in a number of ways: (1) when the
plaintiff first came in contact with the harmful drug; (2) when the
first symptoms of the injury became manifest; or (3) when the
plaintiff first discovered or reasonably should have discovered that
her injury resulted from her use of the drug.3 0
In those jurisdictions in which the injury is said to occur upon
the potential plaintiff's initial contact with the drug, DES plaintiffs encounter the most rigid procedural barrier to bringing suit.
The interval between the in utero contact with the drug and the
first physical manifestations of injury or disease is generally a minimum of ten years, which is well beyond the statutory period."
New York, for example, adheres to this type of traditional, restrictive statute of limitations interpretation, in which the limitation
period commences at the time of the ingestion or first exposure to
a toxic substance. In Fishler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,"2 a New York court
dismissed the case, holding that the statute of limitations for DES
daughters begins to run when they are born, and, for their
mothers, at the date they last ingested the drug.33 However, in
New York, like most jurisdictions, DES daughters are afforded
some relief because the statutory period is tolled for a minor until
majority is reached, but the action must be brought within a pre28. See Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. at 172, 371 A.2d at 174.
29. R. HURSCH & H. BAILEY, supra note 11, at § 17:7 n.57.
30. In these [product liability] cases there are several possible time periods when an injury could be said to have occurred for statute of limitation purposes. An injury could be said to occur when the potential plaintiff first comes in contact with the chemical, drug or pollutant which
causes the harm ....

On the other hand, the injury could be held to

occur when the symptoms of the disease or injury manifest themselves
....
Lastly, the time of injury ... could be considered to be the time
when the potential plaintiff first discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that the disease resulted from plaintiff's use of defendant's
defective product.
Birnbaum, supra note 23, at 281.
31. See supra note 8.
32. No. 15861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
33. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 534 (Oct. 9, 1981). Another New York court

ruled that a DES action was barred by the statute of limitations in Hechtlinger v.
Eli Lilly & Co., No. 09285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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scribed period thereafter.3 Such was the case in the landmark decision of Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.8 6 The action survived the New
York statute because the plaintiff, who was diagnosed as having
cancer at age seventeen, brought her suit prior to reaching the
statutory cut-off date." This was the first lawsuit won by a DES
daughter against a pharmaceutical company that produced DES.3
Some jurisdictions, which are not as rigid as New York in interpreting their statutes of limitations, define the injury as occurring when the first symptoms of the disease or injury manifest
themselves, or when "the potential plaintiff first discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the disease resulted from the
plaintiff's use of the defendant's defective product."' 8 Even under
this more flexible approach, however, DES plaintiffs do not always
qualify. In a recent federal case, O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co.,3s a
United States Court of appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment for the defendant, barring the action because it was not filed within the two year statutory period.
In this case the plaintiff claimed to have discovered in September
of 1979 that DES caused her injury. She filed her suit one month
later. The court acknowledged Pennsylvania's judicially created
"discovery" rule;40 in a personal injury action the two year period
of limitation begins to run "from the time the plaintiff, through
the exercise of due diligence, should have learned both the facts in
question and that those facts bore some causative relationship to
the injury.""1 The court found the "knowledge" requirement to entail a three-pronged test 4 and, measuring the facts against this
34. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 208 (McKinney 1975) (period runs for three years
after age of majority is reached).

35. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
36. See supra note 34. The claims of Mr. Bichler, the father, were barred by
the running of the statute, however.
37. Bichler is also the first successful DES case to have been upheld by a
state's highest court; the New York Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the
lower and appellate courts. Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1982, at 8, col. 4.

38. See supra note 30.
39. 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
40. For a discussion of the different definitions of "discovery" as used in various jurisdictions see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 970 n.23.
41. O'Brien, 668 F.2d at 706.

42. That test required proof of (1) knowledge of the injury, (2) knowledge of
the operative cause of the injury, and (3) knowledge of the causative relationship

between the injury and the operative conduct. Id. at 709 (citing Volpe v. JohnsManville Corp., 4 P.C.R. 290, 295 (Phila. C.P. 1980)).
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standard, the court concluded (conceding that it was a close case)
that in 1976 "by the exercise of due diligence, she [the plaintiff]
could have discovered both the alleged operative cause of her injury-her mother's ingestion of DES-and the causal relationship
between the operative conduct and her injury." 8 In a scathing dissent, Judge Higgenbotham attacked the majority for demanding a
"far higher requirement of diligence than what a rational jury
might expect from a frightened teenager who learns for the first
44
time that she has cancer."
In contrast to the O'Brien decision, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed a jury to determine if the "knowledge" requirement of the Illinois statute of limitations had been met.4 5 In Needham v. White Laboratories,4 ' the
jury found that the time period between when the plaintiff first
knew that DES had caused her cancer and when she commenced
her action was less than two years, thereby satisfying the statute.
On appeal sufficient evidence was found in the record to support
the jury's finding. Although the plaintiff overcame the statute of
limitations barrier and received a jury award, the decision was reversed and remanded on other grounds. 7
Although a state's statute of limitations may be the "discovery" type, some state legislative enactments limit the time period
for "discovery" by setting an absolute cut-off date on the filing of
claims in a products liability action.4 8 These statutes have been
challenged as being repugnant to state constitutional provisions. In
Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,'4 a Florida District Court of Appeals strictly applied the Florida statute of limitations involving
43. O'Brien, 668 F.2d at 709. The court believed that the plaintiff should
have known that DES was related to her injury in 1976 when, at the age of
nineteen, she had been told she had cancer, had read an article on DES in Newsweek magazine, and had consulted her physician.
44. O'Brien, 668 F.2d at 713 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
45. The Illinois statute provides for a two year limitation period, running

from the point at which "the cause of action accrued . . . ." ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
83, § 15 (1979). The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted that provision to

mean that the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should have
known of the injury and the defendant's error. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 69,
250 N.E.2d 656, 666 (1969).
46. 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981).
47. Id. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980) (putting a ten year cap on
products liability actions).

49. 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979).
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products liability suits and barred the DES action." On further
appeal, however, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the state's
twelve year limitations period on products liability actions as ap-

plied to DES plaintiffs violated the Florida Constitution's guaran-

tee of access to the courts" by barring petitioner's right of action
before it ever existed.52 Specially concurring, Justice McDonald

recognized that the plaintiff had an accrued cause of action, "but it
was not recognizable through no fault of hers because the injury
had not manifested itself."
In contrast to the Florida decision, a constitutional attack by a
DES plaintiff recently failed in a Tennessee federal court. In

Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., 54 the court ruled that, although harsh,
the statute which put a ten year cap on products liability actions
did not violate the state constitution. Applying a strict interpreta-

tion, the court said: "It is well settled that statutes of limitation

are vital to the welfare of society and favored in the law."" The
court concluded that any remedy for the inequities resulting from
the application of a statute of limitations must be provided by the
legislature, and that the court did not have the power to insert an

exception into the statute."' Mathis is now pending5 7 before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

50. The statute provides in part:
(2) Actions for products liability and fraud under subsection (3) of sec.
95.11 must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with
the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of
action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise
of diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in
subsection (3) of sec. 95.11, but in any event within twelve (12) years
after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser or the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of
the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been
discovered.
FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1977).
51. 'The courts shall be open to every person for redress of injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." FLA. CONST. art I, § 21
(1968).
52. Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
53. Id. at 672 (McDonald, J., concurring).
54. No. CIV-2-169 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
55. Mathis v. Eli Lilly & Co., DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)648 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 10, 1981).
56. Id.
57. Id. Just a month prior to the Mathis dismissal in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, the United States District Court
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There are other problems which arise in relation to statutes of
limitations. Many potential DES plaintiffs knew that their injuries
were caused by DES but did not know that they could seek remedy
in the courts. According to Nancy Adess, National Director of DES
for the Middle District of Tennessee interpreted the same statute as not applying
to existing rights of action of minors or affecting the applicability of the minors'
savings statute. The decision was not made on constitutional grounds, however,
but rather was based on an interpretation of legislative intent and construction of
the statute. Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., 522 F. Supp. 1048, 1051-52 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
The United States Supreme Court's decisions relating to access to the courts
as a fundamental right have generally involved the invalidation of economic barriers restricting access in criminal and civil proceedings. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 512-13 (1978) [hereinfter cited as
NOWAK]. The recent constitutional attacks against state enacted cut-off dates in
products liability actions add a new dimension to the analysis of this fundamental
right, since the barriers in these cases are not economic. A parallel can be drawn
between Justice Harlan's reasoning in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971),
and the effect of state legislation as applied to some DES plaintiffs. In Boddie,
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, emphasized that "due process requires, at a
minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process
must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Id. at 377. He also stressed
the fact that "exclusion from the only forum effectively empowered to settle their
disputes" was a critical factor to be considered. Id. at 376.
The Florida Supreme Court in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So.2d
671 (Fla. 1981), applied a similar due process analysis and agreed that application
of the statute would abolish the plaintiff's right of action before it ever accrued,
thus depriving her of the only hope of redress, the right to be heard in a judicial
forum. Id. at 672.
The Supreme Court has been divided on the issue of whether to apply a due
process or equal protection analysis to this line of cases. See NOWAK, supra, at
512, 619-21. The concurring opinion in Diamond reflects this uncertainty. Although not specifically stated in equal protection terms. Justice McDonald did
not find the statute offensive but only its application to a plaintiff, who through
no fault of her own, was unaware of her accrued cause of action. Diamond, 397 So.
2d at 672 (McDonald, J., concurring). In contrast, the Mathis court found the
countervailing state interest in a well-ordered judicial system to be of overriding
significance and therefore the DES plaintiff's bar to access to the courts was not
uunconstitutional. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
The trend of the Supreme Court has been to curb the applicability of Boddie
in other civil contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973);
Ortwien v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). The dissents in these close decisions,
however, have emphasized the due process rationale, the opportunity to be heard
when one claims a legal right and the inability to have a claim of right determined
other than in a court of law. See NOWAK, supra, at 513-14. Thus, the issues raised
in the current products liability actions may have a far-reaching significance in
the area of constitutional law.
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Action, many women were unaware that they had a cause of action
until the highly publicized Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories" decision in California." By *thattime, however, the statute of limitations had run on many possible claims. In response, some plaintiffs
advanced the theory that the date upon which they learned of the
Sindell decision constituted the "discovery" of their cause of action, thereby triggering the running of the statute of limitations. A
San Francisco Superior Court judge, however, granted a motion by
a defendant drug company to disallow references to knowledge of
the Sindell decision or of the existence of a class action as events
starting California's one year statute of limitations to run.60 The
defendant drug company argued that. "the belated discovery of a
legal theory. . . will not toll the statute of limitations, nor will the
existence of a class action." 61
There is a reluctance in some jurisdictions to allow a jury to
decide the time of injury in product liability cases of the DES type.
These courts may fear that equity-minded jurors would allow a totally innocent and injured plaintiff, with whom they may identify
and sympathize, to have her day in court.' Furthermore, some
judges feel that certain cases are too complicated for a jury to understand and correctly apply the rules of law." Courts may also
fear opening the doors to a growing stream of potential DES plaintiffs,64 as well as to the other numerous toxic injury suits waiting in
the wings." In sum, for the DES plaintiff, her present age and the
age when she first discovered or should have discovered the connection between her injury and DES will determine whether she
can get into the courtroom to plead her case.
58. 85 Cal. App. 3d 23, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (2d Dist. 1978).
59. Telephone interview with Nancy Adess, supra note 5.
60. Khosnevis v. Abbott Laboratories, DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 779 (San
Francisco Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1981).
61. Id.
62. See the discussion in The American Jury System, Annual Chief Justice
Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States, Final Report 70 (June
24-25, 1977)
63. Id. at 98.
64. It is estimated that up to three million women took DES during pregnancy. Note, Market Share Liability, 1980 FOR THE DEFENSE 18.
65. It has been suggested that there are over 6000 pending lawsuits involving
asbestos alone. Podgers, supra note 8, at 827.
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Class Action Certification
A second procedural hurdle which hag impeded DES litigation
is securing class action status. "6 Because of the large number of
potential plaintiffs with similar histories of maternal DES ingestion, some suits have sought class action certification and most
have encountered difficulty. 7 While class actions have been used

primarily in securities, antitrust and civil rights cases, class status
rarely has been granted in mass tort claims."8 Those cases where a
class has been certified have involved a "single occurrence" such as
66. Class suits were provided for in the federal courts by former Fed. Eq. R.
38 and continued in Rule 23' of the FED. R. Civ. P., which was revised in 1966.
Subdivision (a) of current Rule 23 can be summarized as providing that
one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of'
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
6 Cyc. FED PROC. § 23.07 at 625-26 (3d ed. 1981).
Subdivision (b) of Rule 23 can be summarized as providing that
an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisities of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and, in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a
risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of.the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that one question of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy.
Id. § 23.08 at 634.
67. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1979);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1981); Rheingold v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,
No. Civ. 74-3420 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1975) 74 Civ. 3420 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1975);
Stack v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, No. GS 77-05944 (Pa. Ct. C.P., June 30, 1977).
68. See Comment, Payton v. Abbott Laboratories:An Analysis of the Massachusetts DES Class Action Suit, 6 AM. J. oF LAw & MED. 243, 246 (1980).
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a fire, air crash or food poisoning incident.6 Part of the class action problem in tort cases stems from the courts' failure to agree
on the scope and application of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 70 The Rule's requirement that predominant common questions of law and fact must exist among class members has
presented the major barrier to DES litigants.71
In Morrissey v. Eli Lilly & Co.,7" the plaintiff sued on her own
behalf and as representative of a class of Illinois DES daughters.
She also claimed to represent a class of all daughters whose
mothers were given DES at the University of Chicago as part of
the Dieckmann Study.73 The court, relying on the Illinois class action statute,7 4 denied class certification, finding the individual
proof requirements of proximate cause as predominating over common questions of law and fact.7 5 The plaintiff claimed that mere
exposure to DES was the injury for which relief was sought and
therefore individual proof requirements were minimal. The court,
69. See In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION REP. 469 (1978); see also FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 969 n.22.
70. See generally Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality and the Class Action Problem, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 (1979). Professor Miller thinks of Rule 23 as a "procedural skeleton requiring fleshing out by
judges and lawyers experimenting with it in an ever increasing range of circumstances and in a variety of innovative ways." Id. at 677.
71. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 969 n.22. See also Note, Market
Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REv.
668, 675 (1981).
72. 76 IMI. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1st Dist. 1979).
73. See supra note 5.
74. The statute reads in part:
Prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action. (a) An action may be
maintained as a class action in any court of this State and a party may
sue or be sued as a representative party only if the court finds:...
(2) There are questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 57.2(a)(2) (1977).
75. Included among these individual proof requirements were:
whether the product was properly prescribed for the mother's then existing medical condition; the dosage of DES prescribed; the amount of
DES actually ingested; the point during the pregnancy at which DES was
started and ended; the hereditary and genetic history and background of
the patient and incidences of cancer or any other disorders suspected;
the patient's exposure to known carcinogenic agents in the environment;
and the personal habits of the individual subjects.
76 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 394 N.E.2d at 1376.
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however, felt that the nexus between exposure to DES in utero
and the possibility of developing cancer was an "insufficient basis
upon which to recognize a present injury. ' 7' ' The plaintiff, by seeking principally an equitable remedy based on exposure rather than
specific injury, hoped to avoid any differing issues of proximate
cause. The court, however, refused to accept "heightened risk" as a
77
personal injury per se.

Other jurisdictions have also denied class certification to DES
litigants. The litigants in Mink v. University of Chicago78 were
DES mothers who also sought to establish a class action based on
the Dieckmann Study but were refused certification. Federal Judge
John F. Grady of the Northern District of Illinois was of the opinion that the circumstances surrounding each claim required individual consideration in the courts.7 In Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,s0
the court similarly found no predominance of common questions of
law and fact; the court in Rheingold v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc."1
would not accept risk of injury as sufficient proof of actual injury.8 '
Class action suits involving DES have been denied in approximately ten jurisdictions thus fars" and plaintiffs' hopes appeared
76. Id.
77. Id. at 759, 394 N.E.2d at 1374.
78. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
79. Id. See also DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 20 (June 9, 1981). Plaintiffs in
the original class action were Patsy Mink, ex-Congresswoman from Hawaii;
Gladys Engle Lang, political science professor at the State University of New
York; and Phyllis Steiss Wetherill, licensed family counselor from Washington
D.C., all mothers who had been administered DES while pregnant as part of the
Dieckmann Study. See supra note 5. Although thee court denied class certification, the three plaintiffs were each allowed to maintain an action for battery. On
December 3, 1981, Judge Grady admitted into evidence the women's emotional
distress claims associated with the alleged risk of cancer or other injuries to their
daughters. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 851 (December 22, 1981). After two weeks
of testimony, there was a surprise agreement made between the plaintiffs and the
University of Chicago. Under the agreement, the University would pay $225,000
to be divided equally among the three plaintiffs. In addition, the University
agreed (1) to provide free diagnostic examinations to sons and daughters exposed
to DES as part of the Dieckmann Study, (2) to provide free medical treatment up
to age 70 to those DES daughters diagnosed as having clear cell adenocarcinoma
of the vagina or cervix and (3) to notify the DES sons and daughters and their
mothers of the diagnostic and treatment service within 60 days of the settlement.
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
80. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
81. No. Civ. 74-3420 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1975).
82. See also Morrissey, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 760-61, 394 N.E.2d at 1375.
83. See DES LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6 (June 9, 1981).
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dim except for a potential breakthrough occurring in Payton v. Abbott Laboratories."'In direct contrast to the previously discussed
decisions, United States District Court Judge Walter J. Skinner
granted class b(3) certification to a group of Massachusetts women
exposed to DES. In an unprecedented move, he carved through the
class barriers perceived by other judges facing the issue. Responding to the call by Professor Arthur Miller for imaginative judicial
management of class actions by willing judges, he avoided "across
the board granting or denial" 5 by making liberal use of subsections (c) and (d) of Rule 23.6
84. 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979).
85. Miller, supra note 70, at 680-81.
86. For an in depth analysis of the Payton ruling see Comment, iupra note
68. Rule 23(c)(1) states that "an order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1). Judge Skinner conditionally certified the plaintiff class, thereby preserving his right to revoke certification if difficulties would arise.
In Payton the class included only those women who (a) were born in Massachusetts, (b) were exposed to DES while in Massachusetts, and (c) were domiciled
in Massachusetts when they received notice of the action. The plaintiffs themselves excluded persons who had already developed cancer because they felt such
persons would prefer to bring their actions individually. By narrowing the class in
this way choice of law problems were avoided and only Massachusetts law would
apply. See In Camera, 5 CLAss ACTION REP. 525 (1978).

Regarding the notice requirement, Rule 23(c)(2) states that in a Rule 23(b)
(3) class action."the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). The
particular problem facing Judge Skinner was that potential class members might
not have knowledge of their DES exposure. If this were the case, indirect notice,
such as by publication, would not be sufficient. Therefore, he required that individual notice be sent to each potential class member with a request for a return
receipt. Only those plaintiffs who presented actual receipt of notice would be
members of the class and bound by the judgment. Consequently, plaintiffs have
organized "The Massachusetts DES Daughters Identification and Notification
Project" to identify all possible members of the class. See Comment, supra note
68, at 277-78.
One commentator has pointed out that the heavy burden placed on the plaintiffs to search through medical records to identify class members, as well as the
high cost of certified mail, might well limit the ultimate class to only several thousand. In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION REP. 525 (1978).
Invoking Rule 23(c)(4)(A) which states, "When appropriate an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues," Judge
Skinner certified a class on 13 specific issues. Included among the issues were:
whether fear, anguish or the increased risk of developing cancer is a compensable
injury under Massachustts law; whether there is a cause of action for injury to a
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As in most of the cases preceding (and following) Payton, the
major stumbling block for Judge Skinner and the issue which invoked the greatest controversy for was the requirement of a predominance of common questions of law and fact, 7 a subject of
much commentary."8 Judge Skinner was impressed with the fact
that "over 90% of the trial time in two individual DES suits was

devoted to the question of whether and when plaintiffs knew or
should have known of the dangers of DES exposure." ' The need
to determine this issue alone, he believed, satisfied the efficiency
aim of the Rule and warranted certification of the class. 90 Damages
then would be assessed in separate individual trials for each defen-

dant, although the defendants argued that this bifurcation of the
trial between liability and damages actually amounted to multiple

fetus; whether a private right of action exists under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act; whether and when the defendants were negligent in manufacturing DES for use by pregnant women to prevent miscarriages; whether defendants
can be held strictly or absolutely liable to plaintiffs; whether defendants engaged
in a "joint enterprise" in producing, marketing and obtaining FDA approval of
DES and, if they did not, whether a defendant can be held liable to a class member who cannot identify the manufacturer of the DES to which she was exposed;
whether and for what periods statutes of limitation bar claims under the various
theories of liability; and whether a person may maintain a cause of action for
exposure to DES if it could be shown that, but for her mother's use of DES as an
anti-miscarriage drug, that person would never have been born. Payton, 83 F.D.R.
at 386-87.
It should be noted, however, that despite procedurally isolating these common issues and seeking their resolution (even if the verdicts are favorable to the
plaintiffs), separate trials to determine the damages of each class member would
still be required. Id. at 395. Judge Skinner granted partial summary judgment in
favor of defendants on the issue of concert of action or joint venture in April,
1981. M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILrry § 11.27[2] (1981).
87. Comment, supra note 68, at 261 & n.101.
88. See id. at 264 stating that Judge Skinner relied on the views of Professor
Moore and Professors Wright and Miller who emphasize a "common nucleus of
operative facts" approach to class certification. Professor Moore's specific criteria
for determining predominance is "the efficiency of class treatment, the significance of the common questions, and whether class certification would result in a
lawsuit that [is] 'seriously distorted.'" 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 23.45[2]
(2d ed. 1980). According to Professor Moore, common questions are predominant
if "the circumstances giving rise to the (b)(3) suit have had a common effect on
the class members, if the determination of the facts and their legal consequences
are common questions of law or fact, and if the adjudication of the common issues
can be effectively severed from the issues of individual injury under Rule
27(c)(4)." Id.
89. Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 391-92.
90. Id. at 392.
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lawsuits tried separately.91 For Judge Skinner, therefore, the pivotal factor in this case was whether or not the court viewed the
liability issue as being common and predominant over the issue of
damages. He certified the class because he found such predominance coupled with a clear separation from the damage questions.
Despite this finding, however, he conceded that resolution of all
thirteen specified liability issues in favor of the class would not
necessarily establish the defendants' liability to any class member,
even apart from the issue of individual damage assessment. 9'
It is this very problem-the determination of liability amidst
so many individual fact patterns-which precluded class certification in other DES cases. If factual differences would create different results despite the separation of the predominating common
issues from the individual subordinate issues, the uniformity of result and judicial economy desired by the framers of Rule 23 would
not be realized. Perhaps an answer to this problem can be found in
Professor Miller's focus on the granting of "partial certification
when appropriate to take advantage of the economics of group adjudication on at least some issues." 93 Considering the size of the
potential Payton class (estimated to be at least 54,000) it would
seem advantageous "for the adversaries and the courts to have
common questions resolved in one action."" Moreover, the cost of
repetitious discovery by individual plaintiffs would deter relief in
many cases. 95
Judge Skinner appeared to follow this reasoning in his justification for class certification:
Mass marketing of potent drugs is a modern phenomenon. Tradi-

tional models of litigation, pitting one plaintiff against one defen-

dant, were not designed to, and cannot, deal with the potential
for injury to numerous and geographically dispersed persons that
mass marketing presents.
The courts are faced with the choice of adapting traditional
methods to the recurrent phenomenon of widespread drug litigation or leaving large numbers of people without a practical means

of redress. It has been the tradition of the common law to adapt.
91. Id. at 395. Some courts have held that the need for a separate trial to
determine damages does not preclude class actions. See Comment, supra note 68,
at 269 & n.141.
92. Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 395.
93. Miller, supra note 70, at 680.
94. Comment, supra note 68, at n.144.
95. Id.
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There is a limit to a court's capacity to deal with major social
problems, but this case seems to me to be still within the historical judicial function of providing redress for violation of a legal
right."

Under his view, factual differences would not preempt the determination of legal principles, even if different results would ultimately result in the bifurcation of individual cases.9 7 The resolution of certain common questions could result in a degree of
predictability and uniformity so greatly lacking in the DES litigation at this time.ss To aid in the resolution of the questions and to
ensure further efficient management of the action, the discovery
process in Payton is being closely controlled by Judge Skinner. 9
96. Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 390.
97. This view is limited, however, to cases where the factual differences establishing the common issue of liability are not so greatly intertwined with the
issue of damages that manageability would be a problem. For example, in
Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (1977), the court emphasized
that the nature of the factual differences would be a consideration when granting
class certification. Id. at 68. The plaintiffs in Windham had suggested bifurcating
the trial, resolving first the common issue of liability and then the damages question. Id. at 70-71. In contrast to Payton, the court refused to do so because of the
complex intertwining of the two issues in the factual background of the case. It
concluded that the severance of the issues would not alleviate the problem of
manageability nor serve judicial economy. Id. at 71-72.
98. Another aspect of the uniformity issue which presently concerns defense
attorneys is the possibility of the offensive use by plaintiffs of collateral estoppel.
"The general rule is that a judgment has no binding effect upon anyone who was
not a party to the action." M. GREEN, BAsIC Civi PROCEDURE 241 (1979). The
trend, however, is definitely in the direction of the demise of this doctrine. Id. at
252.
The Supreme Court has accepted the use of offensive collateral estoppel and
has granted trial courts broad discretion when determining its application. See
Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). The situation could arise where a
DES plaintiff who was not a party in a prior action would seek to prevent the
defendant drug company from litigating an issue which the defendant had previously and unsuccessfuly litigated in a action with another DES plaintiff
elsewhere.
For this reason DES defendants may tend to settle the "smaller" suits
outside of court for fear of an adverse judgment being used offensively against
them in a later "larger" action. The resolution of the certified class issues in Payton would be directly related to the issue of collateral estoppel.
99. As part of a program developed by DES defense attorneys, Judge Skinner
ordered depositions of two DES experts "knowledgable in the state of medical
knowledge" between the late 1930's and the 1970's. One expert deponent was Dr.
Don Carlos Hines, a former employee of Eli Lilly, who had personal knowledge of
the early clinical investigations of DES and the drug's history at the FDA. The
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The long term effects of the Payton suit probably will not be
known for some time. Although Judge Skinner defined the class
and the issues very narrowly, one commentator has suggested that
it is highly significant that any class at all was certified.'** Perhaps
Payton's main contribution to DES litigation will be as a stimulus
for settlement.101
With respect to damages, the most positive effect of a class
action would be the facilitation of the method of recovery, such as
through the establishment of trust funds. The trust fund is seen as
the best vehicle for matching compensation to the degree of harm
inflicted on the individual members of the class.10 '
In sum, the class action may afford the best possible alternative for resolving the issues of liability, even if it is of little assistance for assessing individual damages.
IDENTIFICATION OF A DEFENDANT

Traditional products liability theory has always required a
reasonable connection between the injured plaintiff, the injuryother was Dr. Edith L. Potter, an internationally respected pathologist noted for
her work in infant deaths and fetal autopsies, including study of infants exposed
in utero to DES. These depositions have been requested for use in numerous
other suits throughout the country. DES Lnrm. Rzp. (ANDRaws) 134 (July 14,
1981). As part of the same program, Dr. Theodore Klumpp, who is considered
primarily responsible for FDA approval of DES, was also deposed. DES LING.
REP. (ANDREws) 420 (Sept. 8, 1981). In San Francisco, however, one firm representing DES plaintiffs in 11 cases claimed it was denied the right to cross examine
Dr. Potter and argued against the use of his deposition in their cases. DES LrITo.
REP. (ANDRzws) 648 (Nov. 10, 1981). The controversy may have arisen because of
Dr. Potter's testimony that in her autopsies she had never found any abnormality
which could be attributed to DES. DES LnIo. REP. (ANDRzws) 586 (Oct. 27,
1981).
100. See In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION Rzp., 469 (1978).
101. Professor Miller points out that "once the case is certified as a class
action, the size of the potential liability takes on a frightening dimension....
[T]he specter of crushing liability increases a case's settlement value and as a
result may encourage counsel to seek class status." Miller, supra note 70, at 679
n.63. It is this aspect of the procedure that has caused the class action to -be labeled by some as "legalized blackmail." See Handler, The Shift from Substantive
to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 9 (1971). Attorney Myron Kronich, however,
stated that in his experience in New Jersey, most DES suits are settled
satisfactorily outside of court. Telephone interview with Myron Kronich, a New
Jersey attorney who represented the plaintiff in Ferrigno (Feb. 2, 1981). The complexities of class action may also provide a stimulus for settlement.
102. See Note, supra note 71, at 675 n.43.
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causing product, and the manufacturer of the injury-causing product.'" s Unlike most products liability plaintiffs, the DES victim is
often faced with an overwhelming problem-an inability to identify the exact injury-causing product and therefore an inability to
prove a definite causal connection with a particular manufacturer.' 0' The majority of the courts in DES litigation have followed
the traditional approach, finding no cause of action when the
plaintiff cannot identify the particular manufacturer of the pills
which caused her injury. 105 That approach, however, may be
changing.
Characteristic of the growth pattern of the common law in
general, there is a gradual process of evolution occurring in the
field of drug products liability,'" and the recent case law in the
DES area is contributing significantly to that growth. This development may be attributed partially to greater societal interest in
the area of products liability.'07 It may also be the result of judicial
acknowledgment that products liability remedies are "essentially a
103. "An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or
for that matter for any tort is that there be some reasonable connection between
the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 236 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
104. See Comment, Industry-Wide Liability, 15 GA. L. REv.423, 426 (1981).
Between 1947 and 1971, approximately 300 companies manufactured or distributed DES. Although some of the companies never marketed the DES for use in
problem pregnancies, it was still possible that their product was used by pharmacists in prescriptions filled for pregnant women. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6
(June 9, 1981). The large number of potential defendant manufacturers accounts
for, a second aspect of the identification problem-the possibility that the actual
manufacturer is not before the court. See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J.
Super., 551, 566, 420 A.2d 1305, 1312-13 (1980).
105. Cases dismissed for failure to identify the particular manufacturer include: McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (3d
Dist. 1978); Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Namm v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981). Ryan v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F.
Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981).
106. See R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LiABLrrY LAW 3 (1980). Although
the author accepts the gradual process of evolution of products liability law in
general, he believes that "the inability to identify the proper defendant for each
injury insures the complete degeneration of courtroom procedure." Id. at 158.
107. Id. at 5. See also Smith, Manufacturers'Plea: Reduce Products Liability, 1981 CAL. J. 363. The author points out that the work of consumer advocates
has contributed to rising public expectations regarding the safety of marketed
goods.
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judicial development which the courts should be free to develop
further."108 Additionally, some courts have come to understand
that modern technology has created a situation in which injuries of
previously unknown magnitude are not only possible, but actually
happen, as exemplified in particular by the DES problem. More
and more plaintiffs may become seriously injured through no fault
of their own and, under traditional tort law, may be without remedy because they cannot identify a particular defendant against
whom to bring an action.'" Whatever the previous underlying policy considerations have been, some courts have recognized a need
for greater judicial flexibility regarding this issue, and are experimenting with theories that afford plaintiffs a judicial remedy for
their injuries." This section of the Comment will categorize and
108. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 65, 289 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1979)
(citing Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co. 395 Mich. 271, 277, 235 N.W.2d 570, 573
(1975)).
109. In Bichler, Judge Kupferman recognized the problem as especially relating to the widespread use of generic drugs because it is almost impossible for the
user or the ultimately harmed person to identify the manufacturer. The judge felt
that some manufacturers should not be allowed to escape liability by "means of
this shroud of anonymity." Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 328, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632. See
also Lyons v. Premo, 170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979) where the court
found that in New Jersey there is a "strong policy which favors recovery by innocently injured plaintiffs who could not otherwise recover because they cannot
identify the source of their injuries." Id. at 192-93, 406 A.2d at 190. In Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court stated:
In our contemporary, complex, industrialized society, advances in science
and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and
which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the
courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery
to those injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these
changing needs.
Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
110. It should be noted that shifting the burden of proof (better termed "disproving causation") from the plaintiff to the defendant and allowing recovery, despite the inability to establish that a particular defendant was the cause in fact of
the injury, is not without precedent in tort law. The idea is neither new nor novel.
Examples include the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where defendants having exclusive control of the instruumentality causing the injury have had the burden of proof shifted to them despite the failure of the plaintiff to prove which
defendant caused the actual injury. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486,
154 P.2d 687 (1944) (plaintiff developed paralysis of the shoulder after appendix
surgery). None of the operating room personnel claimed responsibility, and the
burden to disprove causation was shifted to them. Although there was no exclusive control by a single defendant in this case, the court applied res ipsa loquitur
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analyze the case law which addresses the legal theories that have
been presented in an attempt to overcome the barrier of non-identification. The four principal theories upon which DES plaintiffs
have based liability in their pleadings are alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability and market share liability."'
because of the special duty of care that the medical profession owes its patients.
Similarly, in Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 929 (1975), a patient was injured during surgery when an instrument broke
and became imbedded in his back. The defendants included the medical staff,
hospital, surgeon, a supplier and the manufacturer of the instrument. The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court and found for the plaintiff, due to
the special responsibility owed a medical patient. At the new trial the burden of
proof was shifted to the defendant. See Nolan, Handling Identification Problems
in Product Liability Cases, 87 CASE & COMMENT 44, 45 (Jan.-Feb. 1982).
The case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), is an example
of the theory of alternative liability. Two hunters were held jointly and severally
liable for injury to the plaintiff because it was not possible to determine which of
the two had actually fired the shot which struck the plaintiff. Since both defendants had acted negligently by firing in the plaintiff's direction, the burden was
shifted to each of the defendants to exculpate himself. The court's decision was
based on a policy of fairness to an innocent plaintiff confronted with concurrent
negligence. See Henderson, Products Liability 3 CoRP. L. REv. 143, 145 (1980).
The doctrine of Summers is now incorporated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS as section 433B(3). For a discussion of alternative liability and its relation
to DES litigation see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 985-95. See also Kroll,
Intra-Industry Liability: A New Era in Products Liability, 1979 INS. L.J. 193,
195-196; Comment, ProductsLiability: Drug Manufacturers Liability For Latent
Defects in Drugs, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 468, 470, 472 (1981).
Another tort theory that allows a cause of action against an unidentified
plaintiff is the concerted action theory. It is exemplified by an illegal drag race
where only one car has actually caused the injury. Because the other drivers were
part of a common design to commit a tortious act, all share in the liability. See,
e.g., Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS, § 876 (1979) which states in part:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he . . . (b) knows the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to
the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
With reference to concerted action, Professor Prosser stated that "express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding." PROSSER, supra note 103, § 46 at 292.
Though these theories are not new, their application to the DES fact pattern
is certainly a departure from tradition.
111. See Kroll, Intra-IndustryJoint Liability: The Era of Absolute Products
Liability, 1980 INS. L.J. 185, 188.
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Alternative Liability
In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,"' a Michigan case, the lower court
denied the plaintiffs a cause of action for failing to identify which
of the named defendants had manufactured the specific, harmful
product." ' The two theories argued on appeal were concerted action and alternative liability.1 1 4 The alternative liability theory was
that "all defendants acted wrongfully in producing and marketing
a defective product, and that each plaintiff was injured by the
product of one of the several defendants."115 The plaintiffs argued
that because all defendants acted wrongfully, even though only one
actually caused the injury, all should be jointly and severally liable
just as were the hunters in Summers v. Tice.116
Recognizing that the plaintiffs faced an enormous burden of
proof as well as the problem of apportionment of damages if they
were to prevail, the Michigan appellate court nevertheless allowed
the cause of action to proceed. Its decision was premised on the
expressed policy of favoring an innocent plaintiff over a wrongdoer
when injustice was inevitable.117 As distinguished from other DES
litigation where the theory of alternative liability had been asserted, the plaintiffs in Abel alleged that they had named "all the
known manufacturers of DES whose products were distributed
during the relevant time period,""" and that one or more of the
named defendants had caused the harm. This allegation most
likely facilitated the court's acceptance of the alternative liability
112. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
113. On appeal, the court clarified the significance of a motion for summary
judgment. It pointed out that such a motion merely tests the legal sufficiency of
the pleadings and does not test plaintiff's ability to prove the allegations. As such,

the trial court had to accept all the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true
and, on review, the appellate court had to do the same. Id. at 65, 289 N.W.2d at
23. This definition of summary judgment is important to note because in many of
the DES cases, the defendants have successfully argued facts relating to proof at
trial and technically having no relation to a motion for summary judgment. For
example, the Ryan court applied traditional tort law and granted a summary
judgment based on non-identification of a defendant. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514
F. Supp. 1004, 1,208 (D.S.C. 1981). See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the concert of action theory see infra text accompa-

nying notes 138-39 and supra note 110.

115. Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 24.

116. Id. See also supra note 110.
117. Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 71-72, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
118. Id. at 61, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
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theory as sufficient to state a cause of action.1 ' In the appellate
court's opinion, the plaintiff need only establish that "one or more
of the named defendants manufactured the DES so ingested."1 20
A showing that all possible tortfeasors are before the court was
not required, however, in one DES case. A New Jersey Superior
Court in Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co.'2 ' interpreted existing New
Jersey law to allow the plaintiffs to proceed on a theory of alternative liability despite a failure to show that all potential defendants
were before the court. Judge Castano analogized the reasoning behind the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v.
Somberg'22 with that required by the DES problem. He believed
that both the majority and the dissent in Anderson recognized that
"the plaintiff's case should not be dismissed merely because of the
possibility that the precise causative agent was not before the
court. 12' The judge also proposed strong policy reasons to justify
allowing the suit to proceed, one of which was the favoring of recovery by innocently injured plaintiffs over "allegedly culpable"
defendants.1 24 If the DES plaintiff proved her allegations, he reasoned, none of the defendants could be considered truly innocent.
The judge also relied on the New Jersey "single indivisible injury"
rule, which essentially tolerates the possibility that "one wrongdoer can escape liability altogether while another tortfeasor may be
25
compelled to pay more than his actual share of the damages.'
The decision did, however, enumerate specific methods by which a
defendant in a DES case could exculpate itself."16 In conclusion,
119. See Norris, Fudala & Watson, Selected Recent Court Decisions, 7 AM.

J. LAW & MED. 193, 215 (1981).

120. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 27.
121. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
122. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
123. Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1312-13. Specifically, he
viewed the Anderson plurality as presuming all defendants were before the court,
and the dissent as rejecting this presumption, but allowing each defendant to
meet the shifted burden of exculpating himself. Judge Castano summarized the
Anderson decision in this way:
Anderson v. Somberg, therefore, deals with both the issue of inability to
identify the precise causative agent and the pbssibility that the precise
causative agent is not among the defendants before the court, and holds,
seemingly without dissent on both issues, that a plaintiff's cause of action survives either event.
Id.
124. Ferrigno,id. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1314.
125. Id. at 570, 420 A.2d at 1315.
126. Among the methods enumerated were: identification of the actual manu-
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Judge Castano found that existing New Jersey precedent allowed
acceptance of the theory of alternative liability in DES cases where
the defendant cannot be identified or may not actually be before
the court.12
In contrast to Ferrigno, other courts have not recognized the
alternative liability theory. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division in Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co.,128 rejected the
reasoning of the lower court in Ferrigno and dismissed the claim
before it on the ground that it was possible that the company
which had actually made the particular injury-causing DES had
not even been named as a defendant.12 9 In Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co.,1 30 the South Carolina federal district court interpreted alternative liability as requiring that all suppliers of the product appear
before the court, and that they be "either (a) in a superior position
to offer evidence of identification, or (b) responsible for plaintiff's
inability to identify the supplier of the drug."13 1
facturer; proof that defendant company never manufactured the drug involved;
proof that defendant did not manufacture DES until after the plaintiff's birth;
proof that the product never reached the outlet where the plaintiff's mother purchased the DES; or proof that defendant never manufactured a drug of the physical description indicated by the plaintiff. id. at 571-72, 420 A.2d at 1316.
127. Id. at 569, 420 A.2d at 1315.
128. 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981).
129. The court went on to say that to apply the alternative liability theory
would result in the taking of the property of all the named defendants in
order to pay for harm which may have been caused by only one of the
defendants or even by one who is not a party to the lawsuit, who in unknown to the defendants, over whom they have no control or even any
meaningful contact.
Id. at 33, 427 A.2d at 1128.
The court also specifically refused to follow the Ferrignointerpretation of the
Anderson decision. Id. at 32 n.3, 427 A.2d at 1127 n.3.
While the Namm decision nullified Ferrigno,Myron Kronisch, plaintiff's attorney in Ferrigno, stated that, though Namm is considered the law of New
Jersey, it is Ferrigno which is being followed. If the issue goes before the New
Jersey Supreme Court, Judge Costano's reasoning in Ferrigno is expected to be
adopted. (Telephone interview with Myron Kronisch, Feb. 2, 1982).
130. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
131. Id. at 1016. The policy justification for shifting the burden of proof of
causation was taken from Summers v. Tice, and based on the grounds that the
defendant is in a better position to offer evidence as to who actually caused the
injury. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d at 87, 199 P.2d at 4 (1948).
It has been argued, however, that the Summers decision did not actually require that the defendant be in a better position in order to shift the burden of
proof of causation. See Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 600, 607
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The California appellate court in Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-

ries sa' relied on Comment (h) of section 433B of the Restatement

of Torts to justify a cause of action based on alternative liability,
despite the lack of joinder of all defendants.' ss In addition, the
court reasoned that the defendants themselves could bring in other
DES manufacturers as cross defendants, further diminishing the
possibility that the actual defendant was not before the court. 1"
The California Supreme Court, on appeal, rejected this reasoning.
They accepted the defendant's argument that "the possibility of
any one of the five defendants having supplied the DES to plaintiff's mother is so remote that it would be unfair to require each
defendant to exonerate himself." 1'
In sum, the short history of DES litigation shows that the alternative liability theory is not accepted in those jurisdictions
which follow the traditional rules of products liability. Those
courts demand that a defendant, that is, the manufacturer or distributor of the drug, be identified as the causal agent for plaintiff's
injury.158 Although some courts have supported this theory, they
P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (1980). Some commentators have noted the
benefits to the plaintiff by shifting the burden and have suggested a "measured
approach when considering the expansion of alternative liability." See Kroll,
supra note 110, at 196.
132. 85 Cal. App. 3d 23, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (2d Dist. 1978).
133. Comment (h) states in part:
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of the rule
stated may be necessary because of complications arising from the fact
that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant,
or because of the effect of lapse of time, or because of substantial differences in the character of the conduct of the act or on the risks which
they have created ... The rule stated in subsection (3)is not intended
to preclude possible modification if such situations call for it.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 433B (1979). See also supra note 110.
134. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 47, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
135. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 139. The defendants further bolstered their position by arguing that
the effect of shifting the burden of proof to them to "demonstrate that they did
not manufacture the DES which caused the injury would create a rebuttable presumption that one of them made the drug taken by plaintiff's mother, and that
this presumption would deny them due process because there is no rational basis
for the inference." Id. at n.17. Ultimately, the California Supreme Court applied a
modification of the alternative liability theory which it termed "market-share."
See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
136. This result was predictable. Although under alternative liability only
one tortfeasor is the actual cause of the injury, the imposition of liability on all is
justified because together there is 100% probability of causation. Without the
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have done so under only two conditions: (1) where the plaintiff can
show all of the defendants were before the court, or (2) where not
all of the defendants were joined but strong policy reasons and the
"single indivisible injury" rule could be applied.
Concert of Action
The concert of action claim rests on the premise that all of the
defendants, acting in concert, caused DES to be marketed, and
that the concerted activity itself, rather than an individual defendant, was the cause-in-fact of the injury. Therefore, all of the defendants should be jointly and severally liable. 187 The Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co. court supported this theory, holding that defendants'
joint breach of their duty of care to the plaintiff resulted from
their concerted action in producing and marketing an ineffective
and dangerous product without adequate testing or warning.1ss
The defendants contended that there was no evidence of concerted
action, but the court determined that this was a disputed question
of fact, not a test of the sufficiency of the pleadings. 89 The court
did not indicate in its opinion, however, just what would constitute
sufficient proof of concerted action.
Although the court in Ferrigno accepted the alternative liability theory, it rejected the plaintiff's concert of action theory. The
reasoning behind the rejection was the distinction made between
the 1940 and 1947 applications to the FDA to market DES. 140 The
joinder of all possible defendants the presumption of actual causation is weakened. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 986.
137. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 67, 289 N.W.2d 20, 24 (1979).
The basic difference between alternative liability and concerted action is that the
former involves "independent acts by two or more tortfeasors, all of whom have
acted wrongfully, but only one has injured plaintiff," whereas concert of action is
a true joint tort in that all acted jointly to produce the harm. Abel, 94 Mich. App.
at 69, 289 N.W.2d at 25. See also the discussion in FORDHAM Comment, supra
note 3, at 978-85. Plaintiffs who assert concerted action to relieve themselves of
defendant-identification problems generally rely on evidence of the encouragement or assistance among the defendants producing the defective product, rather
than on the production itself. As pointed out by Attorney Elliot M. Kroll, by so
doing "the issue of who manufactured the product in question loses its prominence . . . ." Kroll, supra note 110, at 195.
138. Abel, 94 Mich. App. Ct. 69, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
139. Id.
140. Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super at 570-71, 420 A.2d at 1315. The court relied
on the holding in another New Jersey case, Lyons v. Premo, 170 N.J. Super. 183,
406 A.2d 185 (179), which also found the different purposes for which each set of
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plaintiffs relied on the 1940 applications to establish concert of action, but because those applications were unrelated to DES use in
pregnancy, the Ferrigno court refused to consider them as evidence
of concerted, tortious activity. The court also emphasized the necessity of alleging that the concerted conduct itself was tortious or
"anti-social behavior," an allegation not made or supported by the
plaintiff. "1
Just as the California Supreme Court in Sindell rejected the
opinion of the appellate court regarding alternative liability, it
similarly refused to apply that court's interpretation of concert of
action to a DES claim. The appellate court had determined that
plaintiff's allegations satisfied the pleading requirements under the
concert of action theory. It found that the fact that every defendant in the case may not have manufactured the particular pills
taken by the mother was not determinative since the pleadings indicated that "each defendant gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the tortious conduct of the others.""" The appellate court also stated that the determination of whether the
defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" would be a jury
question. The truth of the allegations or their proof was said not to
be a matter of concern at that stage of the pleadings.'4 Therefore,
identification of the actual
the appellate court concluded that
144
manufacturer was also irrelevant.
The California Supreme Court's analysis, however, found that
there was "no concert of action among defendants within the
meaning of that doctrine."14 The court held that the plaintiff's allegations did not amount to a charge of tacit understanding !or a
common plan because the "parallel or imitative conduct in reliance
on each other's testing and promotional methods" was a common
practice in the industry, and insufficient to support the allegaapplications was made to be determinative. In Lyons, the court also rejected the
alternative liability theory because the defendant had been identified. To use that
theory, the court emphasized, a plaintiff must be ignorant of the source of her
injury. Id. at 194, 406 A.2d at 190.
141. Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 571, 420 A.2d at 1315.
142. Sindell, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (quoting Orser v.
Vierra, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 668, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708, 712 (3d Dist. 1967)).
143. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 38, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
144. The court noted that "the issue of who caused the injury is secondary to
the fact that the group engaged in joint hazardous conduct." Id. (citing Hall v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)).
145. 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
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tions.'" The court would require the plaintiff to prove that each
defendant knew the other's conduct was tortious and that the
manufacturers encouraged one another to refrain from testing
14 7
DES.
The Ryan court, after discussing the derivation of the concert
of action theory from the criminal law, rejected applying it to the
DES suit before it.1'4 Citing both the Sindell decision and section
876 of the Restatement of Torts, the court determined that the
plaintiffs would have to prove, in addition to parallel behavior,
"evidence of some agreement-express or tacit-or a common plan
among the manufacturers not to test adequately or not to warn of
dangers that were known." 1 ' This, the court stated, the plaintiff
had not done.150
In Bichler, the court allowed a "limited expansion of the doctrine of concerted action to cover the type of circumstances faced
in a DES case." 15' The concerted activity claimed was essentially
the same as in Abel, the wrongful testing and marketing of the
drug for treatment of problems of pregnancy. 52 The plaintiffs,
146. Id. at 604, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
147. Id.
148. 514 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
149. Id. at 1016.
150. The court's own interpretation of the history of DES led to its conclusion of an absence of any agreement. "The history of stilbestrol, far from showing
joint conduct, demonstrates an independent, competitive response to a widely acclaimed discovery, all under the regulatory supervision of the Food and Drug Administration." Id. at 1011. It is questionable whether the Ryan court was interpreting facts rather than law, contrary to the definition of summary judgment. As
stated by the appellate court in SindeU, "the question of plaintiff's ability to
prove the allegations or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court." 85 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
151. 70 A.D.2d at 328, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
152. Id. at 320, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628. In Bichler, however, suit was brought
only against Lilly. The basis of concerted action was Lilly's cooperation with 12
other DES manufacturers in pooling information and in agreeing on a basic
formula. Also, Lilly's literature was used as a model for package inserts after it
was submitted to the FDA for approval. Since the jury in Bichler found all manufacturers of DES jointly liable under the concert of action theory, Lilly would be
permitted to seek apportionment from other manufacturers for the plaintiff's
award. See Nolan, supra note 110, at 47.
Technically, however, none of the other companies could be bound by the
decision since they were not joined as parties to the suit and are free to challenge
liability. Another problem inherent in this approach is that Lilly would have to
show concert of action to prevail against any other manufacturer, the very fact
Lilly denied in the Bichler case. See Birnbaum, supra note 5, at 32-33.
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however, specifically contended that the drug companies paralleled
each other in failing to test DES properly as a result of some implied understanding. 15 8 The court viewed concert of action as being
analogous to a "joint control of the risk" as discussed in the case of
Hall v. DuPont De Nemours & Co.' " This control, the court reasoned, could be shown by evidence of explicit agreement, or by
parallel behavior from which tacit agreement sufficient to sustain
the concert theory could be inferred. '5 The court found the evi'
dence sufficient and upheld the jury award of $500,000.
153. 79 A.D.2d at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
154. 345 F. Supp. 353, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Kroll, supra note 111,
at 188.
155. 79 A.D.2d at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633. See also PROSSER, supra note
103, § 46 at 292 (a tacit understanding suffices in the absence of an express agreement). The inference of concerted activity drawn from the defendant's behavior is
not easy to show. See Henderson, Products Liability, 3 CORP. L. REv. 143, 145-46
(1980).
156. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed both lower
courts. Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1982, at 8, col. 4. One of the most difficult arguments faced by the plaintiff in Bichler was the defendant's claim that the early
marketing approval by the FDA in 1941, upon which the alleged concerted activity was based, had nothing whatsoever to do with the use of DES in pregnancy.
Therefore, according to the defendants, none of the parallel conduct shown was
really tortious in nature and the concert allegation should fail. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d
at 320, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628. This problem of proof was overcome to the satisfaction of the appellate court by evidence showing that even at the time of the original approval, Lilly was contemplating the use of DES during pregnancy. Id. The
contention was further bolstered by the fact that the later application to the FDA
for approval for use during pregnancy relied on data in the original application
and no changes were proposed. Id. at 330, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633. Analysis of this
aspect of the decision indicates that the crucial element for the plaintiff was establishment of a connection between the first and second filings with the FDA.
Another defense presented in Bichler was that the cooperation which the
plaintiff labeled tortious was in fact invited by the FDA. Id. The. court held, however, that despite the government involvement, the association known as the
"Small Committee" was voluntarily formed, and the jury was justified in finding
that the defendant, Lilly, acting as leader, helped organize and set the pattern of
acceptance by the FDA. Evidence of the original cooperation in 1940 of the twelve
manufacturers, the pooling of information, the agreement on the same basic
formula, and the use of Lilly's literature as a model for package inserts was found
sufficient to show an express agreement was made at that time. Id. There was also
evidence of conscious parallel activity at the time of the second approval from
which could be inferred a tacit understanding. Id.
The Bichler decision has been criticized for its comparison of the conscious
parallel behavior pattern establishing liability in anti-trust cases to that of the
DES fact pattern. Since an additional "plus factor" is usually required under the
Sherman Act, it has been argued that parallel behavior alone is not enough to
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These holdings, which have addressed the concert of action
theory to establish liability, show widely differing views concerning
the amount of flexibility used in applying the theory to DES cases.
As a result, it is unclear what is the precise nature of the allegations a DES plaintiff must plead in order to establish a cause of
action based on concert of action and to avoid a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. These cases have required allegations ranging from a simple statement that "all defendants, acting
in concert, caused the marketing of DES, and that this concerted
activity is the cause of the plaintiff's injury, ' 15 7 to a showing that
the defendant-manufacturers knew each others' conduct was tortious and that they actually encouraged one another to refrain
from testing DES. 58
Another problem facing the DES plaintiff is that some courts
appear to have blurred the distinction between the adequacy of the
concert of action charge in the pleadings and its ultimate proof at
trial. Although the allegations must be supported by certain factual statements in the pleadings, a few courts seem to have taken
it upon themselves to resolve the issues of fact, rather than to label
them triable.159
Enterprise Liability
The theory of enterprise liability' ° is grounded on the premise
that "losses to society, created or caused by an enterprise or, more
simply, by an activity, ought to be borne by that enterprise or activity."'' Arguably, it represents the most radical of all of the
liabity theories offered by DES litigants."' At present, the theory
establish liability in the DES cases. See Birnbaum, supra note 111, at 31.
For an autobiographical account of the case from the time of the discovery of
the plaintiff's cancer to the rendering of the jury's verdict see J. BICHLER, DES
DAUGHTER (1981). The case vividly illustrates the extensive amount of discovery
and research before trial and expert testimony during trial which is necessary to
prevail in a DES suit.
157. Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
158. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 604, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
159. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
160. Enterprise liability is sometimes referred to as "industry wide" or "collective" liability. See infra notes 161-64.
161. Klemme, The EnterpriseLiability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLo. L. REv.
153, 158 (1976). Professor Klemme presents an extensive analysis of the historical
and economic aspects of enterprise liability.
162. Elliot Kroll suggests that enterprise liability is actually more a "social
justification for the imposition of tort remedies than it is a theory of liability."
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in its pure form has not been accepted by any court involved in
DES litigation. " One reason suggested for this is "the possibility
of far reaching and unpredictable results.""'
The Abel court rejected the theory without explanation.'" In
Ferrigno, though the theory was introduced by the plaintiff, the
court found it unnecessary to consider its applicability.'" The
Ryan majority also rejected the doctrine because it was "repugnant
to the most basic tenets of tort law" and "would render every manufacturer an insurer not only of the safety of its products, but of
"1O The
all generically similar products made by others ..
plaintiffs in Namm argued that the reason for imposing collective
liability was "because the acceptance of DES by the medical profession and the unsuspecting public was the consequence of a cumulative effort by all who entered the market as manufacturers
Kroll, supra note 110, at 196.
163. M. DIXON, supra note 86. See also FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3,
which is referred to extensively throughout the DES cases, and explains the theory in detail and its applicability to DES actions.
Essentially the theory is rooted in the concept of joint control of the risk. It is
the industry wide standard which is really at fault. The Sindell court recognized
seven requirements that would be essential to maintain a cause of action:
1.) There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety as to
the manufacture of the product.
2.) Plaintiff is not at fault for the absence of evidence identifying the
causative agent but rather, this absence of proof is due to defendant's
conduct.
3.) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the
defendants.
4.) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this defect.
5.) Defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member.
6.) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was
caused by a product made by one of the defendants. For example, the
joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of such defective
products on the market at the time of plaintiff's injury.
7.) All defendants were tortfeasors.
26 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
164. Comment, Industry-Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of the Missing
Manufacturers in Products Liability Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. Rzv. 139, 146
(1981). It is suggested, however, that economic considerations, such as the superior ability of the manufacturer to bear the cost when a consumer is injured as a
result of a defective product, do support the acceptance of the industry-wide liability theory. Another consequence might be the encouragement of greater product safety or even "strict self-regulatory controls." Id. at 149-150.
165. 94 Mich. App. at 73, 289 N.W.2d at 27.
166. 175 N.J. Super. at 569, 420 A.2d at 1315.
167. 514 F. Supp. at 1017.
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• . .[and] of immense promotion and advertising to which defendants contributed a mite, or a treasure or something in between."' 8 The Namm court refused to adopt the theory because of
its departure from traditional products liability law and the difficulty of apportioning damages.'"
The Sindell court distinguished the Hall v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., Inc.170 case upon which plaintiffs relied and which
approved of the enterprise theory. The court found significant differences between the situations in Hall and Sindell. To begin with,
there was a great disparity between the number of manufacturers
in the two cases. Hall involved six manufacturers whereas there
were over 200 manufacturers of DES.17 ' In addition, the Sindell
court determined that joint control of the risk in Hall was based
upon allegations of a trade association relationship, a factual situation missing in Sindell.'17 Lastly, the court held that the imposition of liability on a manufacturer under these circumstances
would be unfair because of the government involvement in standards imposed on the drug industry. 78
The underlying rationale in all of the decisions rejecting enterprise liability is that the law of torts does not include a theory of
liability which would allow an entire industry to be held strictly
liable for an injury caused by a defective product. Yet, there is a
strong argument to support the proposition that the Sindell deci7
sion comes very close to doing just that. '
Market Share Liability
In Sindell, the California Supreme Court fashioned a new basis for liability called "market share." In this landmark decision, a
method was devised to impose several liability only; each defendant was held liable for only that percentage of the judgment de168. 178 N.J. Super. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1128.
169. Id. at 35, 427 A.2d at 1129.
170. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). It has been suggested that the reliance made on Hall is erroneous since the term "enterprise" as used in that case,
was really an expression of a form of vicarious liability. See Kroll, supra note 111,
at 189.
171. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Sindell court went on, however, to formulate the market-share
approach, discussed infra. See also Berns & Lykos, Sindell v. Abbott Labs-"The
Heir of the Citadel," 15 THE FORUM, 1031, 1037-39 (1980).
174. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
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termined to be its share of the total DES market. In addition, each
was free to prove that it could not have made the DES which
caused the injury. As a result, the plaintiff needed to join as defendants only those
manufacturers with a "substantial" share of the
17 5
DES market.
Although the theory does not espouse absolute liability of
manufacturers, the focus in Sindell was definitely on the industry.17 " The fault concept is removed because the plaintiff needed
only to show a likelihood that the defendant supplied the product.1 7 The Sindell court differentiated between market share liability and enterprise liability, the latter requiring a suggested seventy-five to eighty percent of the market being represented by the
manufacturers while the former requires that a manufacturer control only a "substantial percentage" of the market.17 8 The Sindell
decision has provoked much commentary. One major criticism is
that the terminology is vague, both as to the required number of
17
defendants and the geographical area of the market.
175. See Note, supra note 64, at 20. In Sindell, five out of a possible 200
manufacturers were joined as defendants. Together they were estimated to have
represented 90% of the market. The court explained:
[W]e hold it to be reasonable in the present context to measure the likelihood that any one of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of
them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose.
26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
176. See Berns and Lykos, supra note 173, at 1036.
177. Id.
178. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. For a mathematical comparison of the allocation of damages under the market-share versus
industry-wide liability approaches see Comment, supra note 104, For a discussion
of the differences between market share and enterprise liability approaches, see
FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3.
179. With reference to the "substantial share" concept, the dissent in Sindell
stated: "The issue is entirely open-ended and the answer is presumably anyone's
guess." 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
Another aspect of this difficulty was brought out by the defendants who
claimed that there were no figures available to determine marketshare and that
since treating pregnancy problems was not the only use of DES, it would be difficult to decide what proportion of the market was used for that purpose. 26 Cal. 3d
at 613 n.29, 607 P.2d at 937 n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 n.29. To combat these
difficulties, litigants are presently seeking reliable marketshare studies for the applicable time periods involved in the DES cases. Market analysts are being employed to compile these figures. DES LITio. REP. (ANDRnws) 12 (June 23, 1981).
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The dissent saw the decision as a guarantee that plaintiffs
would always prevail on the issue of liability, because "defendants
are no more capable of disproving factual causation than plaintiffs
are of proving it."1 0 The theoretical criticisms, as well as the practical difficulties of application of the decision, prompted one writer
to label it "rough justice."181
Sindell was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but
certiorari was denied.1 8 2 The probable effect of letting the decision
stand was interpreted by some to be a likely inducement for other
jurisdictions to follow the market-share approach.18s That forecast
has not yet proven true.
The other jurisdictions that have been presented with the
marketshare theory have dealt with it in a variety of ways. The
Bichler court made positive references to Sindell and its marketshare approach, but applied, instead, a limited expansion of the
Abbott Laboratories recently answered a DES plaintiff's interrogatories regarding
marketshare by stating that the company had no records of the location of sales
or amount of DES sold in the 1950's and 1960's. DES LMG. REP. (ANDREWS) 980
(Jan. 26, 1982).
Other attacks on the decision focus on potentially sharp increases in insurance premiums and the reluctance of insurance companies to deal with manufacturers of high risk products. As a result, many companies may be forced to do
business without insurance coverage. Consequently, some smaller companies may
be forced out of business. See Smith, supra note 107, at 363-64.
Other potential results of the decision may be an overload on the judicial
system as well as the high costs of defending the suits, resulting in higher taxes
and higher product costs. Id. The possibility of high jury awards in these cases
may result in some attorneys exhibiting the "sue the bastards" syndrome. Id. Although many commentators hope that one of the corollary outcomes of Sindell
may be greater industry safety standards, one commentator foresees a possible
decrease in product safety because manufacturers may feel that despite extra care
they could still be held responsible for the negligence of other manufacturers.
Note, Market Share Liability for DES (Diethystilbestrol)Injury: A New High
Water Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. REv. 432, 444 (1981). It may end up being
less costly to pay tort claims than to improve product safety in some cases. Consequently, the number of injuries may not be reduced and an important goal of tort
law would be lost. Id.
180. 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
181. Note, Market-Share Liability and DES-Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: Square Pegs in Round Holes, 13 CONN. L. REv. 777, 812 (1981).
182. 440 U.S. 912 (1980). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme
Court still has the option to hear other DES cases at any time. DES LrrG. REP.
(ANDREWS) 9 (June 9, 1981).
183. DES LM. REP. (ANDREWS) 7 (June 9, 1981).
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concert of action theory.1 8 4 The New Jersey court in Ferrignocom-

pared the similar reasoning but different results of Sindell and the
New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Anderson.185 It noted that
California rejected the use of alternative liability without modification, but in contrast, the Anderson court was not deterred in its
application of that theory, despite the fact that all possible responsible parties were not joined as defendants. 8s Adhering to the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court, Ferrigno rejected the
Sindell version of alternative liability and saw no need, therefore,
to follow the market-share approach.
The court in Namm, while nullifying Ferrignoand specifically
rejecting alternative and enterprise liability, explicitly avoided ruling on the marketshare theory of Sindell. The opinion indicated,
however, that the refusal to even consider a change in existing law
was due principally to that court's intermediate appellate status.187
The court held that any drastic change in law should come from
the legislature or from the court of last resort.188 By so ruling, the
court "left the door open" for the New Jersey Supreme Court to
apply marketshare liability. 89
The marketshare approach was emphatically denounced by
the Ryan court, which labeled it a rejection of "over 100 years of
tort law." 1 90 It concluded that the new theory was not the law of
either North Carolina or South Carolina. 91 In addition, the court
stated that the plaintiff had presented no evidence to show that
production constituted a substantial share of the
the defendants'
192
DES market.
184. 79 A.D.2d at 326-30, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631-63.
185. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
186. The opinion cited the parallel wording of the two cases:
It is interesting to observe that both courts used the almost identical
language. California spoke of a "substantial likelihood" and New Jersey
of "a far greater likelihood" that the specific wrongdoer is not a named
defendant. Our Supreme Court, nevertheless, did not feel that it was unfair to require each defendant to exonerate himself despite such a
likelihood.
Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1314.
187. 178 N.J. Super. at 35, 427 A.2d at 1128.
188. Id.
189. DES LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)9 (June 9, 1981).
190. 514 F. Supp. at 1018 (quoting Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 939,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting)).
191. 514 F. Supp. at 1018.
192. Id. Six months after the Ryan decision, Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F.
Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981) was decided by the United States District Court in South
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At this time the theory of marketshare liability has not been
recognized to a great extent in jurisdictions other than California.
Those courts which are allowing DES actions to proceed appear to
be applying any one of the other theories of liability or a combination thereof. Plaintiffs often list all four theories of liability in their
pleadings, allowing the court to choose.103
BURDEN OF PROOF

If the DES plaintiff manages to overcome the statute of limitations, certification of a class (if she chooses class action), and the
problem of identifying the proper defendant, she next faces the
heavy burden of proving her allegations. Although this Comment
will not address all aspects of the plaintiff's burden, a general discussion will be presented emphasizing the two DES cases, Bichler
1 94
and Needham, which were successful for the plaintiffs.
It is generally accepted that a plaintiff's burden of proof in a
drug products liability case, whether pleaded in negligence, warranty or strict liability in tort, is that (1) the plaintiff was injured
by the product; (2) the product was defective and unreasonably
Carolina. The plaintiff sustained her DES injury in utero while in California.
Since her injury occured there, she attempted to apply the marketshare theory of

SindeU. The MizeU court, however, applied the Ryan rule, reasoning that under
South Carolina choice of law rules marketshare liability could not be applied, the
theory being contrary to the public policy of the forum. The court stated:
Market share liability represents a radical departure from the body of
products liability law that has been developed in South Carolina. By removing the traditional requirement that the plaintiff identify the responsible manufacturer, the doctrine destroys the nexus between production
of a defective item and the plaintiff's injury. As a result, liability is
placed on defendants bearing no responsibility for the defective product.
526 F. Supp. at 596 (footnote omitted).
193. A recent complaint filed in Illinois included marketshare among the
other theories of liability. McGuire v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. L-30208 (Cook County
Cir. Ct., filed Dec. 31, 1981). In a Florida asbestos case (Dombroff v. Armstrong
Cook, No. 14048 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1979)), a circuit court judge dismissed defense motions for summary judgment and allowed application of a combination of enterprise liability and market share theories. DES LrrG. REP. (ANDREWS) 338 (Aug.
25, 1981). The court enumerated four conditions which the plaintiff would be required to prove and also worked out a type of marketshare apportionment of
damages. Id. at 338-39. It is interesting to note that the judge in this case was a
respected law professor who served as a county judge and had only been filling in
temporarily at the circuit level. His was the only pro-Sindell ruling among 30
other judges who had dismissed marketshare theories. Id.
194. See supra note 8.
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unsafe; and (3) the defect existed at the time the product left the
hands of the particular defendant. 195 The DES plaintiffs have little
difficulty establishing that DES caused their injury or that DES
was "defective" at the time it left the defendant's hands.'" The
principal problem of proof centers on whether DES was unreasonably unsafe; that is, whether the defendant knew or should have
known that DES was unsafe at the time of manufacture or distriof foreseeability is necessary
bution, or whether that requirement
197
at all in a strict liability action.
It has been noted that in drug products liability cases, the
negligence standard of foreseeability is required even in an action
for strict liability.''8 Such a standard requires proof that by applying the medical knowledge and testing methods available at the
time, the reasonable manufacturer should have foreseen the risk of
injury from the drug.199 If scientific knowledge or testing methods
to obtain that knowledge did not exist at the time of manufacture,
the defendant will successfully 'rebut the plaintiff's claim. The
Bichler and Needham cases have been the only two which have
fully addressed the issue of foreseeability and its relevancy in DES
cases.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Needham acknowledged that section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is
the law in Illinois.200 The court saw 402A as providing that "one
who sells a product in a 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous' is subject to strict liability for any harm caused by the product defect. 20 1 Three possible situations could exist which would
warrant finding a product unreasonably dangerous: (1) impurities
contaminated the product; (2) the product was unaccompanied by
a warning of its dangerous propensities; or (3) although a warning
the risk of danger outweighed the beneaccompanied the product,
202
fits of the product.
The court stated that for an impure or contaminated product,
liability is imposed on the defendant regardless of whether all possible care had been taken in the preparation and sale of the prod195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See PROSSER, supra note 103, § 103.
See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 964-66 nn.5-10.
Id. at 967 n.18, 971 n.25.
Id.
Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 103, § 99.
639 F.2d at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id.
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uct 2 03 In the second situation-failure to warn of an inherent danger-the court found that comment j of 402A and the Illinois
courts' interpretation of that comment required a warning "only if
the manufacturer had knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight, should have had knowledge of the danger.

21 04

Therefore, "a product bearing such a warn-

ing, which is safe for use if [the warning] is followed, is not in
5
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. ' 20 In the

third situation-unavoidably unsafe products-the court found
comment k of 402A controlled, but that Illinois had not yet ruled

on such a situation.2 0 6 The court then adopted the analysis of the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.20 7 The Davis court had held that "an unavoidably un-

safe product is neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous if
such a product is 'properly prepared; and is accompanied by
proper directions and warnings.' ,,2o8 Whether a manufacturer can
avail itself of a comment k defense is dependent on a two-step test
being met: once it is established that a product is unavoidably unsafe and the danger is warned against, the product will be per se
unreasonably dangerous if (1) the dangerousness of the product
outweighs its utility and (2) the warnings and safeguards are
insufficient.0 9
Applying this interpretation of 402A to the facts, the Needham court disposed of the impurity situation since it is DES itself,
not impurities in it, that caused the injury.210 The court then
found that the comment k situation-unavoidably unsafe drugsis available to a manufacturer as a defense "only where the manufacturer warned of the danger, yet the product remains dangerous
203. Id. The court relied on Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47

Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) which held that to allow a defense to strict
liability on the ground that no way existed for a defendant to ascertain the existence of impurities, would emasculate the strict liability doctrine and "signal and
return to negligence theory." Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
204. 639 F.2d at 400 (citing Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 35,
402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (1980)).
205. 639 F.2d at 400 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1964)).
206. 639 F.2d at 401.
207. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).

208. Id. at 1274 (quoting

k (1964)).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

209. Needham, 639 F.2d at 401.
210. Id. at 402.

OF

TORTS

§ 402A, comment
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even if the warning is followed." ' To apply comment k implies
that the manufacturer knew of the dangers and warned against
them. Because White's defense throughout the case had been "that
it did not know of the dangerous propensity of dienestrol [and]
[n]o warning accompanied the drug," the court found that, by its
own terms, comment k did not apply.2 1 2 Comment j, however, did
apply and the jury was correctly charged that it could find White
liable "if White knew or should have known that dienestrol could
cause cancer in female offspring of the pregnant user. ..

."'

The

case was reversed and remanded for a new trial, however, because
the trial court improperly charged the jury that liability could be
based on the inefficacy of DES in preventing miscarriage. The evidence, said the court, was relevant only to a comment k defense,
1
not a comment j defense. '4
The Needham analysis imposes a foreseeability standard on
DES cases brought under 402A. It seems curious that Needham
applied comment j to DES when the court itself emphasized that
that comment applied to a drug "which is safe for use if [the
warning] is followed .
,,.,5 It could hardly be argued that DES
was safe for use, even with a warning, because its use in any manner during pregnancy created likelihood of injury. It would seem
that the "unavoidably unsafe" product, to which comment k applied, more accurately describes DES than does comment j.216
Comment k was, nevertheless, also found not applicable by the
court in Bichler because the plaintiff did not claim that DES,
though unavoidably unsafe, would not have been unreasonably
dangerous if accompanied by proper warnings.217 The plaintiff had
claimed that DES was a defective product because it was not reasonably safe for the risks of pregnancy and therefore it should not
have been marketed at all, with or without warnings."' Although it
was not clear whether the Bichler court applied comment j, it held
that the jury had been properly charged with the foreseeability
standard required under New York strict liability law."' 9 That
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 402 n.9.
Id. at 400.
But see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 967 n.18.
79 A.D.2d 317, 318 & n.7, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 635 & n.7.

218. Id.
219. Id. at 316-17 436 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
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standard required the jury to decide whether "in 1953, when Mrs.
Bichler used DES, a reasonably prudent manufacturer should have
foreseen that DES might cause cancer in the pregnant user's offspring, considering the state of scientific knowledge and techniques
then existing. '22 0 The court found that the evidence was overwhelming that the dangers of DES were foreseeable in 1953.221
These two cases both required the plaintiff to prove that DES
dangers were foreseeable at the time the drug was manufactured
and marketed for use in pregnancy. This negligence standard of
proof imposed on a strict liability action for DES was predicted by
one author,2 2 2 although other commentators have argued that the
drug products liability cases should require "pure" strict liability
as to the manufacturers even if inherent dangers in the drugs were
unknowable at the time of manufacture. 2 Although this stricter
standard would benefit the DES plaintiff, the Bichler and Needham cases show that the evidence necessary to meet the foreseeability standard is available in sufficient quantity and quality.
Only after more DES cases survive the pleading stage and go to
trial will this standard of proof issue become clearer.
LEGISLATION

Manufacturers' fears of potentially crushing liability have
prompted attempts to deal with the problem of drug products liability legislatively.' 2 4 For example, in California a recent bill was
introduced which would have required plaintiffs filing product liability suits to know the name of the specific manufacturer who
produced the drug. 225 The bill, if passed, would have overturned
the Sindell decision. DES action groups, consumer groups and lawyers' organizations lobbied against passage and were successful. A
220. Id. at 318, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
221. Id.

222. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 3, at 967 n.18.
223. Id.
224. The most recent example giving rise to these fears occurred in Philadelphia where a DES plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million. The defendant was E.R.
Squibb & Sons. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1982, at 16, col. 6.
225. S.B. 228, introduced by Sen. Ed. Davis (R.-Los Angeles). Telephone in-

terview with Nancy Adess, supra note 5. Another part of the bill would have created a study committee to develop a compensation scheme. Those opposing the
bill felt that if Sindell were legislatively overruled while no compensation scheme

was in effect, DES daughters would have no recourse. In addition, it was feared

that the statute of limitations would expire while the study was still in committee.
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similar attempt to pass a product liability bill in Texas has twice
been defeated."2 s
At the national level, Robert Kaste, Republican Senator from
Wisconsin, released a draft of a proposed bill that would reform
product liability law.2 7 The effect of the bill, if passed, will be to
cut off the possibility of litigation after a very short time." s A legislative enactment of this type would have the effect of rendering
moot most of the issues addressed in this Comment.
CONCLUSION

This overview of DES litigation indicates that, despite some
common threads running throughout the cases, the primary factor
determining a DES plaintiff's success or failure in court is the
choice of policy in the jurisdiction in which the action is brought.
Specifically, the way in which the forum treats the statute of limitations, class action certification, and the need to identify the injury-causing product and manufacturer are determinative of the
litigation outcome. A second critical factor is the burden of proof;
on whom will it fall and what standards will be required. Although
plaintiffs bring their actions in strict liability, it appears the burden falls on them to prove that the dangers of DES were foreseeable by the manufacturers at the time DES was produced. Unless a
consistent policy is developed as to the nature and proof of the
claims of injury, DES litigation will continue to resemble the essentially patternless fabric of jurisprudence it is today.
SHARON C. BRENNAN

226. S.B. 511 was a general products liability bill which would have made it
impossible to bring suit more than one year after a product was put on the
market.
227. DES LrriG. REP. (ANDREws) 716 (Nov. 24, 1981).

228. The bill would set a two year statute of limitations from the time a
claimant discovered or should have discovered the harm and its cause. Id. at 717.
Sen. Kaste stated:

The need to stabilize this area of law is clearly evident. Conflicting product liability have made it extraordinarily difficult for consumers to know
their legal rights and for product sellers to know their obligations. This
has created expensive and burdensome legal costs which are passed on to
consumers. The uncertainty has also created instability in the insurance
market, which has been subject to sharp swings in cost.
Id. at 716.

